Noise and perceptual indiscriminability

Mind 114 (455):481-508 (2005)
Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'
Keywords Color  Discrimination  Epistemology  Noise  Perception  Transitivity
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Pete Mandik (2012). Color-Consciousness Conceptualism. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.
Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.

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