Love in the time of cholera

In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. pp. 241–261 (2014)
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Abstract

We begin with a theory of the structure of sensory consciousness; a target phenomenon of 'presentation' can be clearly located within this structure. We then defend the rational-psychological necessity of presentation. We conclude with discussion of these philosophical challenges to the possibility of presentation. One crucial aspect of the discussion is recognition of the <cite>nonobjectivity</cite> of consciousness (a technical appendix explains what I mean by that). The other is a full-faced stare at the limitations of rational psychology: much of the dialectic in the philosophy of perception pertains to matters beyond the limits of coherence---a breakwater against which philosophy crashes, and rolls back.

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Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

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Subjectivism and the Mental.Giovanni Merlo - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):311-342.
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References found in this work

The character of consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind.Evan Thompson - 2007 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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