David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164 (2011)
A direct realist theory of perceptual justification. I take a ground-up approach, beginning with a theory of subjective rationality understood in terms of first-person rational explicability of the stream of consciousness. I mathematize this picture via a Tractarian spin on a semantical framework developed by Rayo. Perceptual states justify by being 'receptive': rationally inexplicable intentional states encoded in sentences that are analytic. Direct realists working within this framework should say that when one is taken in by hallucination one's overall picture of the world is incoherent; in this sense, a belief based on delusive hallucination can be provided with exculpation but not with justification.
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Citations of this work BETA
Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
Heather Logue (2013). Visual Experience of Natural Kind Properties: Is There Any Fact of the Matter? Philosophical Studies 162 (1):1-12.
Neil Mehta (2015). Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):n/a-n/a.
Benj Hellie (2016). Obligation and Aspect. Inquiry 59 (4):398-449.
Jacob Berger (2014). Mental States, Conscious and Nonconscious. Philosophy Compass 9 (6):392-401.
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