Temporal parts of four dimensional objects

Philosophical Studies 46 (3):323 - 334 (1984)
Abstract
I offer a clear conception of a temporal part that does not make the existence of temporal parts implausible. This can be done if (and only if) we think of physical objects as four dimensional, The fourth dimension being time. Unless we are willing to deny the existence of most spatial parts, Or willing to accept the possibility of coincident entities, Or accept something even more implausible, We should accept the existence of temporal parts
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372910
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Ryan Wasserman (2016). Theories of Persistence. Philosophical Studies 173 (1):243-250.
Meg Wallace (2011). Composition as Identity: Part 2. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):817-827.
Theodore Sider (1996). All the World's a Stage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):433 – 453.
Kris McDaniel (2010). Parts and Wholes. Philosophy Compass 5 (5):412-425.

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