David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63 (2007)
I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable
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Josh Weisberg (2011). Misrepresenting Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.
Benj Hellie (2007). Factive Phenomenal Characters. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.
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University of Toronto at Scarborough
This is by a wide margin my most-downloaded paper on PhilPapers. Why is this? I don't think it's my /best/ paper -- 'Multidisjunctive' and 'Externalist's guide' are more interesting, in my view; and 'Noise' is (IMHO!) the final word on its subject-matter (if sort of hard to read).