|Abstract||This somewhat odd paper argues against a representational view of visual experience using an intricate "inversion" type thought experiment involving double vision: two subjects could represent external space in the same way while differing phenomenally due to different "spread" in their double images. The spatial structure of the visual field is explained not by representation of external space but functionally, in terms of the possible locations of an attentional spotlight. I'm fond of the ideas in this paper but doubt I'll be returning to it soon.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Robert Briscoe (2009). Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423 - 460.
Gary Hatfield (2003). Representation and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space. Acta Psychologica 114:355-378.
R. W. Kentridge, L. H. de-Wit & C. A. Heywood (2008). What is Attended in Spatial Attention? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):105-111.
Mika Koivisto & Antti Revonsuo (2007). Electrophysiological Correlates of Visual Consciousness and Selective Attention. Neuroreport 18 (8):753-756.
Keith Allen (2013). Blur. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):257-273.
Todd Ganson & Ben Bronner (2013). Visual Prominence and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):405-418.
Random House, Representation and Constraints: The Inverse Problem and the Structure of Visual Space.
Shaun P. Vecera (2000). Toward a Biased Competition Account of Object-Based Segregation and Attention. Brain and Mind 1 (3):353-384.
Wayne Wright (2006). Visual Stuff and Active Vision. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #15,755 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #14,877 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?