Der fortbestand Von lebewesen
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (1):81-91 (2007)
In this essay I defend the claim that the life of a living being is not one of its properties but something different: a mode of being. It follows from this that living beings should not be taken to be things that possess the property of being alive. Second, I argue that living beings are essentially involved in ongoing activities as long as they exist. Life cannot only be a disposition to be active, but must itself be an ongoing activity. Third, I suggest that for something to be a living being is to engage in activities whose success is determined by criteria that emerge exclusively from a proper account of the nature of the living being in question. To identify something as a living being is not to attribute a particular property to it, but to say what criteria apply to what it actually is or does.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ludger Jansen (2013). Warum sich Artefakte ihrer Marginalisierung widersetzen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (2):267-282.
Similar books and articles
Aaron Smuts (2013). Five Tests for What Makes a Life Worth Living. Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (4):1-21.
Peter Heuer & Boris Hennig (2008). The Classifications of Living Beings. Smith and Munn:197--217.
Brooke Alan Trisel (2007). Judging Life and Its Value. Sorites (18):60-75.
Ronald Sandler (2012). Is Artefactualness a Value-Relevant Property of Living Things? Synthese 185 (1):89-102.
Fred Ablondi (1998). Automata, Living and Non-Living: Descartes' Mechanical Biology and His Criteria for Life. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 13 (2):179-186.
Gary S. Rosenkrantz (2001). What Is Life? The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2001:125-134.
David Morris (2005). What is Living and What is Non-Living in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Movement and Expression. Chiasmi International 7:225-238.
Boris Hennig (2006). Naturteleologie, Reduktiv. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 113 (2):296--315.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-10-03
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?