Der fortbestand Von lebewesen
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 32 (1):81-91 (2007)
In this essay I defend the claim that the life of a living being is not one of its properties but something different: a mode of being. It follows from this that living beings should not be taken to be things that possess the property of being alive. Second, I argue that living beings are essentially involved in ongoing activities as long as they exist. Life cannot only be a disposition to be active, but must itself be an ongoing activity. Third, I suggest that for something to be a living being is to engage in activities whose success is determined by criteria that emerge exclusively from a proper account of the nature of the living being in question. To identify something as a living being is not to attribute a particular property to it, but to say what criteria apply to what it actually is or does.
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Ludger Jansen (2013). Warum sich Artefakte ihrer Marginalisierung widersetzen. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 61 (2):267-282.
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