Does reasonable nonbelief exist?

Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):75-92 (2001)
J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason claims that the existence of reflective persons who long to solve the problem of God’s existencebut cannot do so constitutes an evil rendering God’s existence improbable. In this essay, I present Schellenberg’s argument and argue that the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for his argument to succeed is unlikely to exist. Since Schellenberg’s argument is an inductive-style version of the problem of evil, the empirical improbability of the premise I challenge renders the conclusions derived from it empirically improbable as well
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA
    Travis Dumsday (2012). Divine Hiddenness and Creaturely Resentment. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1):41-51.
    Similar books and articles
    Imran Aijaz & Markus Weidler (2007). Some Critical Reflections on the Hiddenness Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 61 (1):1 - 23.
    Daniel Howard-Snyder (1996). The Argument From Divine Hiddenness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):433-453.

    Monthly downloads

    Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

    Added to index


    Total downloads


    Recent downloads (6 months)


    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.