David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 30:169-188 (2005)
Habermas and Brandom remain divided on a key point in their theories of language concerning the priority of a participant vs. a third-person, observational perspective onto language. I examine this dispute as it has played out in a recent exchange between them, attempting to explicate and defend a qualified version of Habermas’s claim in the light of his more developed treatment of this issue elsewhere. Once the defensible content of Habermas’s claim is clarified, I argue that Habermas’s critique of Brandom highlights an important way in which Brandom fails to follow through adquately in the development of his own understanding of language as a distinctively social practice. The value in Habermas’s criticism of Brandom’s work lies not in exposing an unbridgeable gulf between their two positions, but in helping us to work out more consistently the social perspective onto language that informs both their work
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kevin Scharp (2003). Communication and Content: Circumstances and Consequences of the Habermas-Brandom Debate. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (1):43 – 61.
Kenneth Baynes (2007). ‘Gadamerian Platitudes’ and Rational Interpretations. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):67-82.
Piet Strydom (2006). Intersubjectivity – Interactionist or Discursive? Reflections on Habermas’ Critique of Brandom. Philosophy and Social Criticism 32 (2):155-172.
Italo Testa (2009). Criticism and Normativity. Brandom and Habermas Between Kant and Hegel. In D. Canale G. Tuzet (ed.), The Rules of Inference. Inferentialism in Law and Philosophy, Egea, Milano. Egea (pp. pp. 29-44).
Steven Hendley (2004). Speech and Sensibility: Levinas and Habermas on the Constitution of the Moral Point of View. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2):153-173.
James Swindal (2003). Discourse, Reflection and Commitment. Philosophy and Social Criticism 29 (2):147-161.
Barbara Fultner (2002). Inferentialism and Communicative Action: Robust Conceptions of Intersubjectivity. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):121 - 131.
Italo Testa (2012). Reconstruction and Pragmatist Metaphysics. On Brandom’s Understanding of Rationality. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):175-201.
James Swindal (2007). Can a Discursive Pragmatism Guarantee Objectivity?: Habermas and Brandom on the Correctness of Norms. Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):113-126.
Mathieu Deflem (ed.) (1996). Habermas, Modernity, and Law. Sage Publications.
Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra Orbach Bookman & Cathy Kemp (eds.) (2002). Habermas and Pragmatism. Routledge.
Pauline Johnson (2001). Distorted Communications: Feminism's Dispute with Habermas. Philosophy and Social Criticism 27 (1):39-62.
Thomas Fossen (2012). Politicizing Brandom's Pragmatism: Normativity and the Agonal Character of Social Practice. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):n/a-n/a.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads6 ( #189,939 of 1,096,280 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #224,942 of 1,096,280 )
How can I increase my downloads?