Morality and Luck

Philosophy 59 (229):323 - 330 (1984)
Thomas Nagel recognizes that it is commonly believed that people can neither be held morally responsible nor morally assessed for what is beyond their control. Yet he is convinced that although such a belief may be intuitively plausible, upon reflection we find that we do make moral assessments of persons in a large number of cases in which such assessments depend on factors not under their control. Of such factors he says: (p. 26)
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DOI 10.2307/3750948
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Michael Cholbi (2014). Luck, Blame, and Desert. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):313-332.
David Enoch (2010). Moral Luck and the Law. Philosophy Compass 5 (1):42-54.

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