David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131 (2009)
The concept of knowledge is used to certify epistemic agents as good sources (on a certain point or subject matter) for an understood audience. Attributions of knowledge and denials of knowledge are used in a kind of epistemic gate keeping for (epistemic or practical) communities with which the attributor and interlocutors are associated. When combined with reflection on kinds of practical and epistemic communities, and their situated epistemic needs for gate keeping, this simple observation regarding the point and purpose of the concept of knowledge has rich implications. First, it gives one general reason to prefer contextualism over various forms of sensitive invariantism. Second, when gate keeping for a select community of experts or authorities, with an associated body of results on which folk generally might then draw (when gate keeping for a general source community ) the contextual demands approximate those with which insensitive invariantists would be comfortable.
|Keywords||Epistemology Knowledge Contextulism Invariantism|
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References found in this work BETA
John Hawthorne (2003). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press.
Jason Stanley (2005). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Hannon (2015). Stabilizing Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):116-139.
Michael Hannon (2013). The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism. Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.
Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
Robin McKenna (2013). Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):101-123.
Robin McKenna (2014). Normative Scorekeeping. Synthese 191 (3):607-625.
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