Psychophysical supervenience: Digging in its foundations

I put forward and defend the thesis (Th) that psychophysical supervenience (PS) in its full generality can be satisfactorily supported if and only if one is willing to make one or another of some substantial assumptions (the Assumptions) about the nature of mental and physical properties. I first deal with the “if” part of the claim by presenting and considering the Assumptions. I then argue for the inadequacy of suggestions of support for PS that do not require any of the Assumptions. Finally, I show that as a result of (Th) a PS claim is made potentially stronger than what it would be if (Th) were false
Keywords Epistemology  Falsity  Psychophysical  Supervenience
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_2002_27
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