David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 21 (40):74-84 (2006)
Among the difficulties that sentential theories of belief face, the problem of clutter asserts that treating beliefs as sentences would make it difficult or impossible to literally fit the number of beliefs possessed by ordinary human cognizers into the mind-brain. I argue that concerns about clutter arise from a misunderstanding of how belief states, whether sentences or not, are causally related. Insofar as a weak computer model of the mind treats information states as virtual states, I explain how the ontology of virtual states seriously mitigates the problem of clutter for sententialism.
|Keywords||Belief Brain Content Language Sentence|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.
David Lewis (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
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