Towards a more plausible exemplification theory of events

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):349 - 375 (2006)
Abstract
Among the most well-known accounts of events is Jaegwon Kim’s exemplification theory, which identifies each event with a property exemplification (often modeled as an “ordered triple” of an entity, property type, and time). Two of the most influential rival event theorists (Lawrence Lombard and Jonathan Bennett) have urged rejecting exemplificationism on the basis of the charge that it ultimately conflates events with facts [Lombard (1986): Events: A Metaphysical Study. Routledge & Kegan Paul; Bennett (1988):Events and their Names. Hackett Publishing Company]. In response, I offer a detailed examination of Lombard and Bennett’s arguments that exemplificationism undermines the event/fact distinction. I then develop and defend a modified version of Kim’s account that overcomes this objection, and so constitutes a more plausible exemplification theory of events.
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1971). The Individuation of Action. Journal of Philosophy 68 (21):761-774.
Jaegwon Kim (1976). Events as Property Exemplifications. In M. Brand & D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory. D. Reidel. 310-326.

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