The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis

Oup Oxford (2011)
Abstract
Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Metaphysics  Cognitive psychology
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Call number BD161.H346 2011
ISBN(s) 9780199608546
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter J. Graham (2014). Against Transglobal Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.
Similar books and articles
David Henderson & Terence Horgan (2000). Iceberg Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):497-535.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):47-63.
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