David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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OUP Oxford (2011)
David Henderson and Terence Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology, which they see as a mixed discipline, having both a priori and empirical elements. They defend the roles of a priori reflection and conceptual analysis in philosophy, but their revisionary account of these philosophical methods allows them a subtle but essential empirical dimension. They espouse a dual-perspective position which they call iceberg epistemology, respecting the important differences between epistemic processes that are consciously accessible and those that are not. Reflecting on epistemic justification, they introduce the notion of transglobal reliability as the mark of the cognitive processes that are suitable for humans. Which cognitive processes these are depends on contingent facts about human cognitive capacities, and these cannot be known a priori.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Metaphysics Cognitive psychology|
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|Call number||BD161.H346 2011|
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Citations of this work BETA
David Henderson & Terry Horgan (2013). Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):599-608.
Peter J. Graham (2014). Against Transglobal Reliabilism. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):525-535.
David Henderson (2013). Entitlement in Gutting's Epistemology of Philosophy: Comments on What Philosophers Know. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):121-132.
Albert Casullo (2014). Uncovering Buried Treasure: Henderson and Horgan on Conceptual Analysis. Philosophical Studies 169 (3):509-523.
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