The frame problem and theories of belief

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33 (2006)
The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Frame  Map  Sentence
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DOI 10.2307/4321761
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Gilbert Harman (1973). Thought. Princeton University Press.

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