Transglobal Reliabilism

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):171-195 (2006)
We here propose an account of what it is for an agent to be objectively justified in holding some belief. We present in outline this approach, which we call transglobal reliabilism, and we discuss how it is motivated by various thought experiments. While transglobal reliabilism is an externalist epistemology, we think that it accommodates traditional internalist concerns and objections in a uniquely natural and respectful way
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DOI croatjphil20066215
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