The role of all things considered judgements in practical deliberation

Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):295 – 308 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, 'all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)' where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections.

Similar books and articles

Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.
‘All Things Considered’.Ruth Chang - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.
Freedom and practical judgement.David Owens - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 122-137.
Social judgement theory and medical judgement.Robert S. Wigton - 1996 - Thinking and Reasoning 2 (2 & 3):175 – 190.
The intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgements.Malcolm Budd - 2007 - British Journal of Aesthetics 47 (4):333-371.
Making exceptions.Henry Shue - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (3):307-322.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
204 (#90,312)

6 months
85 (#44,038)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Edmund Henden
Oslo Metropolitan University

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Thomas E. Hill & Arnulf Zweig.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell.

View all 41 references / Add more references