What Kant might have said: Moral worth and the overdetermination of dutiful action

Philosophical Review 88 (1):39-54 (1979)
My purpose is to account for some oddities in what Kant did and did not say about "moral worth," and for another in what commentators tell us about his intent. The stone with which I hope to dispatch these several birds is-as one would expect a philosopher's stone to be-a distinction. I distinguish between two things Kant might have had in mind under the heading of moral worth. They come readily to mind when one both takes account of what he actually said about it and notices a fact which he did not seem to notice: namely, that dutiful action- action which, whatever its motive, fulfills a duty-can be over- determined, and determined in particular by both respect for duty and some consortium of inclinations and prudenc
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Samuel C. Rickless (2004). From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):554–577.
Nelson Potter (1996). Kant and the Moral Worth of Actions. Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):225-241.

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