Aristotle on the reducibility of all valid syllogistic moods to the two universal moods of the first figure (APrA7, 29b1–25) [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (1):73-78 (2004)
In Prior Analytics A7 Aristotle points out that all valid syllogistic moods of the second and third figures as well as the two particular moods of the first figure can be reduced to the two universal first-figure moods Barbara and Celarent. As far as the third figure is concerned, it is argued that Aristotle does not want to say, as the transmitted text suggests, that only those two valid moods of this figure whose premisses are both universal statements are directly reducible to Barbara and Celarent, but rather that it is those four valid moods of this figure whose respective minor premisses are universal statements of which this is true. It is shown that in order to carry this sense the transmitted text has to be corrected by inserting just one word, which seems to have dropped out
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