Mind and Society 1 (1):25-39 (2000)
|Abstract||With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available for conducting empirical inquiry and constructing models be incorporated in social science graduate education|
|Keywords||rationality economic rationality psychological rationality bounded rationality under uncertainty utility theory decision theory scientific discovery game theory|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gerd Gigerenzer (2010). Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):528-554.
Gonzalo Munevar (1986). Consensus and Evolution in Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:120 - 129.
Adam Morton (2010). Human Bounds: Rationality for Our Species. Synthese 176 (1):5 - 21.
Philippe Mongin (2000). Does Optimization Imply Rationality? Synthese 124 (1-2):73 - 111.
Shabnam Mousavi & Jim Garrison (2003). Toward a Transactional Theory of Decision Making: Creative Rationality as Functional Coordination in Context. Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (2):131-156.
Danny Frederick (2013). Popper, Rationality and the Possibility of Social Science. THEORIA 28 (1):61-75.
Robert C. Robinson (2006). Bounded Epistemology. Ssrn Elibrary.
Frédéric Laville (2000). Should We Abandon Optimization Theory? The Need for Bounded Rationality. Journal of Economic Methodology 7 (3):395-426.
Frederic Laville (2000). Foundations of Procedural Rationality: Cognitive Limits and Decision Processes. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):117-138.
Added to index2010-08-10
Total downloads25 ( #55,649 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #36,644 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?