David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 62 (4):455-482 (2008)
Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M, then S has M. Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, arguing that although the principle applies when M is a belief, it does not apply when M is an emotion. I account for this asymmetry by focusing on differences in the commitments that belief and emotion conceptually involve, and briefly sketch out a psychological explanation of those differences. I conclude that one can reasonably split one's epistemological loyalties between constitutivism regarding meta-beliefs and non- constitutivism regarding beliefs about one's emotions.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Jesse J. Prinz (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions. Oxford University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Larry A. Herzberg (forthcoming). On Knowing How I Feel About That—A Process-Reliabilist Approach. Acta Analytica:1-20.
Similar books and articles
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
Jennifer Smalligan Marušić (2010). Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183.
Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giacomo Bonanno (1997). The Logic of Belief Persistence. Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):39-59.
Lisa Damm (2011). Self-Deception About Emotion. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):254-270.
Sabine A. Döring (2003). Explaining Action by Emotion. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):214-230.
Paul Katsafanas (2011). Deriving Ethics From Action: A Nietzschean Version of Constitutivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):620-660.
Peter Goldie (2000). Explaining Expressions of Emotion. Mind 109 (433):25-38.
Nicholas Silins (2012). Judgment as a Guide to Belief. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press
Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2006). Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke's Criticisms of Constitutivism. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):337-379.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads26 ( #145,153 of 1,792,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #281,799 of 1,792,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?