Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-75 (1998)
I argue that in rejecting Cartesian ‘mind’ and retaining Cartesian ‘body’, materialism/physicalism falls to the allure of three charming but deadly ‘eliminative’ identities: perceivable properties become particles in motion; perception, by being ‘sensationized’, turns into neuronal activity; and a perceiver becomes a brain in a body. In rebuttal I argue that ‘particles in motion’ does not nullify but instead preserves the perceivable properties it seeks to explain; ‘neuronal activity’ is not a reduction of, but is doubtlessly necessary to, perception; and a perceiver is not a brain in a body, since ‘body’ in the Cartesian/materialist context is a conceptual confusion that reifies a human being's physical side
Keywords Body  Dualism  Materialism  Metaphysics  Locke
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA
    Norman Malcolm (1980). Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat. Philosophical Investigations 3 (1):12-20.
    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index


    Total downloads

    47 ( #29,467 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature

    Start a new thread
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.