Dualism/materialism

Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):159-75 (1998)
Abstract
I argue that in rejecting Cartesian ‘mind’ and retaining Cartesian ‘body’, materialism/physicalism falls to the allure of three charming but deadly ‘eliminative’ identities: perceivable properties become particles in motion; perception, by being ‘sensationized’, turns into neuronal activity; and a perceiver becomes a brain in a body. In rebuttal I argue that ‘particles in motion’ does not nullify but instead preserves the perceivable properties it seeks to explain; ‘neuronal activity’ is not a reduction of, but is doubtlessly necessary to, perception; and a perceiver is not a brain in a body, since ‘body’ in the Cartesian/materialist context is a conceptual confusion that reifies a human being's physical side
Keywords Body  Dualism  Materialism  Metaphysics  Locke
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References found in this work BETA
Norman Malcolm (1980). Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat. Philosophical Investigations 3 (1):12-20.
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