Priority in Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Michail Peramatzis [Book Review]

Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (4):676-677 (2013)
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Abstract

Few concepts are more important to Aristotle’s Metaphysics than that of priority. References to what is prior, and to what is first (that is, prior in an absolute way) are to be found on nearly every page of the Metaphysics. A book-length study of priority in the Metaphysics is, then, long overdue, and Michail Peramatzis’s detailed and intriguing new book is particularly welcome. Peramatzis divides the book into two parts. Part 1 is dedicated to “definitional priority,” which can be understood as follows: A is prior in definition to B if A enters into the definition of B, but the converse does not hold. Peramatzis examines and resolves an apparent conflict between two claims concerning the definitional ..

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