Is there life after the death of the computational theory of mind?

Minds and Machines 15 (2):183-194 (2005)
In this paper, I explore the implications of Fodor’s attacks on the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), which get their most recent airing in The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way. I argue that if Fodor is right that the CTM founders on the global nature of abductive inference, then several of the philosophical views about the mind that he has championed over the years founder as well. I focus on Fodor’s accounts of mental causation, psychological explanation, and intentionality
Keywords Abduction  Computation  Explanation  Inference  Metaphysics  Mind  Fodor, Jerry
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DOI 10.1007/s11023-005-2003-3
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