David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Ratio 21 (2):168–181 (2008)
E.J. Lowe is one of the few philosophers who defend both the existence of spatially coincident entities and the Principle of Weak Extensionality that no two objects which have proper parts have exactly the same proper parts at the same time. Lowe maintains that when spatially coincident things like the statue and the lump of bronze are in a constitution relation, the constituted entity (the statue) has parts that the constituting entity (the lump) doesn’t, hence the compatibility with Weak Extensionality. My contention is that his argument for why the statue has parts the lump of bronze lacks can also be used to show that the lump of bronze has parts the statue doesn’t. This will mean that there is no basis for saying the statue and the lump are in a constitution relation. I argue for accepting a modified account of constitution and abandoning the Principle of Weak Extensionality.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Lynne Rudder Baker (2000). Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press.
Kit Fine (2000). A Counter-Example to Locke's Thesis. The Monist 83 (3):357-361.
David B. Hershenov (2003). Can There Be Spatially Coincident Entities of the Same Kind? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1):1 - 22.
David Hershenov & Rose Koch-Hershenov (2006). Fission and Confusion. Christian Bioethics 12 (3):237-254.
E. J. Lowe (2002). A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael C. Rea (1998). Sameness Without Identity: An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution. Ratio 11 (3):316–328.
Eric T. Olson (1996). Composition and Coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (4):374-403.
L. A. Paul (2010). The Puzzles of Material Constitution. Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.
Ryan Wasserman (2002). The Standard Objection to the Standard Account. Philosophical Studies 111 (3):197 - 216.
Lynne Rudder Baker (1999). Unity Without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):144–165.
Tomasz Kakol (2005). The Samep-Relation as a Response to Critics of Baker's Theory of Constitution. Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (5/6):561 - 579.
Michael C. Rea (2000). Constitution and Kind Membership. Philosophical Studies 97 (2):169-193.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #82,861 of 1,410,540 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #46,503 of 1,410,540 )
How can I increase my downloads?