Lycan on the subjectivity of the mental

Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38 (1998)
Abstract
The subjectivity of the mental consists in the idea that there are features of our mental states that are perspectival in that they are accessible only from the first-person point of view. This is held to be a problem for materialist theories of mind, since such theories contend that there is nothing about the mind that cannot be fully described from a third-person point of view. Lycan suggests a notion of “phenomenal information” that is held to be perspectival in the relevant sense but also perfectly objective, since it is explicated in terms of the computational roles of higher-order mental representations. I argue that his project fails because phenomenal information is accessible to observers, and hence it fails to be perspectival in the required sense. That sense demands that there be aspects of our conscious experiences that cannot be intersubjectively compared
Keywords Mental  Ontology  Science  Subjectivity  Lycan, W
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DOI 10.1080/09515089808573257
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.

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