David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 40 (2):357-363 (2012)
A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.
|Keywords||Truth Deflationary theory Austin, J. L. Horwich, Paul Dummett, Michael Speech acts|
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References found in this work BETA
J. L. Austin (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press.
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
J. L. Austin (1950). Truth. Aristotelian Society Supp 24 (1):111--29.
John Austin (1961). Compiled by JO Urmson and GJ Warnock. In J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (eds.), Philosophical Papers. Clarendon Press.
Michael Dummett (1959). Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
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