David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):269 - 280 (2005)
. In his work on language John Searle favors an Austinian approach that emphasizes the speech act as the basic unit of meaning and communication, and which sees speaking a language as engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. He couples this with a strident opposition to cognitivist approaches that posit unconscious rule following as the causal basis of linguistic competence. In place of unconscious rule following Searle posits what he calls the Background, comprised of nonintentional (nonrepresentational) mental phenomena. I argue that these two aspects of his philosophy of language cannot be reconciled. In order to preserve his view of language as a rule-governed activity, he must embrace the cognitivist idea of unconscious rule following. Finally, I try to show how such an accommodation would be far less traumatic to Searle’s philosophical system than it might otherwise seem.
|Keywords||Linguistics Philosophy of Language Artificial Intelligence Computational Linguistics Semantics Syntax|
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References found in this work BETA
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
John R. Searle (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
Noam Chomsky (2000). New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
John R. Searle, Barry Smith, Leo Zaibert & Josef Moural (2001). Rationality in Action: A Symposium. Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66 – 94.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Hershfield (2011). Critical Notice/Études critiqueJohn Searle's Making the Social World. Dialogue 50 (04):759-778.
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