Truthmakers and the Consequence Argument

Abstract

Recent work in the truthmakers literature demonstrates that the logic of truthmaking is distinct from classical logic. Since free will is an ontological issue, and not merely a semantic issue, arguments about free will ought to be sensitive to these developments. In Truthmakers and the Direct Argument, Hermes argues that one of the main arguments for incompatibiilsm fails precisely where the truthmakers literature would predict. Here, I argue that similar problems make the Consequence Argument untenable.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Truthmakers and the Direct Argument.Charles Hermes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (2):401-418.
The Incompatibility of Free Will and Naturalism.Jason Turner - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):565-587.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.
Divine determinism, human freedom, and the consequence argument.Leigh C. Vicens - 2012 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
A master argument for incompatibilism?Tomis Kapitan - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 127--157.
So-far incompatibilism and the so-far consequence argument.Stephen Hetherington - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):163-178.
Truthmakers (are indexed combinations).Wolfgang Freitag - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248.
Why Truthmakers?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford University Press. pp. 17-31.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-18

Downloads
308 (#59,295)

6 months
51 (#73,634)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Charles Hermes
University of Texas at Arlington

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references