David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Offered are two epistemic accounts of deliberative democracy which suggest the reasonable minority has epistemically sound reasons to willingly follow a reasonable majority position. One of these accounts suggests that the truth will be on the side of an overwhelming rational majority. This is because it is less likely that there is a widespread cognitive failure that “contaminates” the moral intuitions of rational majority than a rational minority. The second account suggests that where there is a rational disagreement, instead of assuming: a) one side is right and the other wrong or b) that they are both failing to discover what justice dictates, or c) that there is no moral fact of the matter, it is sometimes plausible to conclude that both views are compatible with justice. While the competing views can’t both be simultaneously realized, it is not contradictory to assert they are both compatible with justice.
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Yann Allard-Tremblay (2012). The Epistemic Edge of Majority Voting Over Lottery Voting. Res Publica 18 (3):207-223.
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