Wrongs, preferences, and the selection of children: A critique of Rebecca Bennett's argument against the principle of procreative beneficence

Bioethics 26 (8):447-454 (2011)
Abstract
Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation – the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong – is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds that the intuitions of those who adhere to the principle are not genuine moral intuitions, but instead simply give voice to mere (non-moral) preferences. This paper, while agreeing that Savulescu's principle does not express a genuine moral obligation, takes issue with both of Bennett's theses. It is suggested that the argument for the negative thesis is either weak or question-begging, while there is insufficient reason to suppose the positive thesis true
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 12,084
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Nils Holtug (2002). The Harm Principle. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (4):357-389.
Roy Sorensen (2004). Charity Implies Meta-Charity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290 - 315.
Mark Schroeder (2011). Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis. Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-02-15

Total downloads

30 ( #62,302 of 1,101,940 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #192,006 of 1,101,940 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.