Philosophy of Science 48 (4):591-605 (1981)
|Abstract||A previous paper of mine, that criticized Suppes' probabilistic theory of causality, was in turn criticized by Deborah Rosen. This paper is a development of my argument and an answer to Rosen. It is argued that the concept of causation is used in contemporary science in a way that presupposes determinism. It is shown that deterministic assumptions are necessary for inferences from generic to individual causal relations and for various kinds of eliminative arguments|
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