David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy Research Archives 11:379-391 (1985)
This paper discusses Alan Gewirth’s claim that the agent of a voluntary action necessarily values his purpose. It holds that not only is Gewirth wrong in making the claim but that his mistake is of serious importance for his moral theory. The criticism proceeds through an examination of the five arguments advanced by Gewirth, explicitly and implicitly, in support of the proposition that any agent necessarily esteems his goal. A key point in the criticism is that an agent of voluntary action might have his goal capriciously and for that reason might not appreciate the goal. The paper concludes by specifying how Gewirth’s inadequate defense of his claim undercuts certain principles of his moral theory, including the Principle of Generic Consistency
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
William M. O'Meara (1982). Gewirth and Adams on the Foundation of Morality. Philosophy Research Archives 8:367-381.
Deryck Beyleveld (1991). The Dialectical Necessity of Morality: An Analysis and Defense of Alan Gewirth's Argument to the Principle of Generic Consistency. University of Chicago Press.
Edward Regis (ed.) (1984). Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply by Alan Gewirth. University of Chicago Press.
Jeffrey Hause (2006). Aquinas on Non-Voluntary Acts. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):459-475.
Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
Rutger Claassen & Marcus Düwell (2013). The Foundations of Capability Theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):493-510.
Stephen Cohen (1979). Gewirth's Rationalism: Who is a Moral Agent? Ethics 89 (2):179-190.
Robert B. Louden (1986). Book Review:Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism: Critical Essays with a Reply by Alan Gewirth. Edward Regis, Jr. [REVIEW] Ethics 96 (3):632-.
Alan Gewirth (1998). The Agent Prescriber's “Ought”. Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):141-143.
Andrew Botterell (2012). Understanding the Voluntary Act Principle. In François Tanguay-Renaud & James Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory: New Canadian Perspectives in the Philosophy of Domestic, Transnational, and International Criminal Law. Hart Publishing.
Vaughn E. Huckfeldt (2007). Categorical and Agent-Neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality. Philosophia 35 (1):23-41.
Flannery (2009). The Division of Action in Thomas Aquinas. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):421 - 440.
Desheng Zong (2000). Agent Neutrality is the Exclusive Feature of Consequentialism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):676-693.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads1 ( #454,238 of 1,100,104 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #304,144 of 1,100,104 )
How can I increase my downloads?