Online research in philosophy

Metaethical relativists sometimes use an interesting analogy with relativism in physics to defend their view. In this article I comment on Erler’s discussion of this analogy and take the discussion further into methodological matters that it raises. I argue that Erler misplaces the analogy in the dialectic between relativists and absolutists: the analogy cannot be dismissed by simply pointing to the fact that we have absolutist intuitions – this is exactly the kind of objection the analogy is supposed to be a defence against. To decide if the analogy works we need to answer the following two questions: (i) Why does it work to say that people refer to relative physical properties (like simultaneity, mass and motion) even though they intend to speak about absolute physical properties? And (ii) does the answer carry over to the moral case? I argue for a specific answer to (i), and argue that it gives us reason to answer (ii) in the negative – so the analogy does not hold. However, looking at the issue more closely also raises questions about a fundamental assumption in metaethical discussion: perhaps we cannot assume that one single analysis holds for everyone’s moral judgments.

There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories, quantum mechanics and special relativity, are false if taken together and literally. If they are in fact false, then how should they count as providing knowledge of the physical world? One might imagine that, while strictly false, our best physical theories are nevertheless in some sense probably approximately true. This paper presents a notion of local probable approximate truth in terms of descriptive nesting relations between current and subsequent theories. This notion helps explain how false physical theories might nevertheless provide physical knowledge of a variety that is particularly salient to diachronic empirical inquiry.

Physical objects are the most familiar of all objects, and yet the concept of a physical object remains elusive. Any six-year-old can give you a dozen examples of physical objects, and most people with at least one undergraduate course in philosophy can also give examples of non-physical objects. But if asked to produce a definition of ‘physical object’ that adequately captures the distinction between the physical and the nonphysical, the average person can offer little more than hand-waving.

Analogical arguments -- Philosophical theories -- Computational theories -- The articulation model -- Analogies in mathematics -- Similarity and patterns of generalization -- Analogy and epistemic values -- Analogy and symmetry -- A wider role for analogies.

It would be nice if our definition of ‘physical’ incorporated the distinctive content of physics. Attempts at such a definition quickly run into what’s known as Hempel’s dilemma. Briefly: when we talk about ‘physics’, we refer either to current physics or to some idealized version of physics. Current physics is likely wrong and so an unsuitable basis for a definition. ‘Ideal physics’ can’t itself be cashed out except as the science which has completed an accurate survey of the physical; appeals to it to define the physical must therefore end up trivial or circular. So defining the physical in terms of physics looks like a non-starter.

CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY "Let lu start with a review of the theories of other thinkers; for the proofs of a theory are difficulties for the contrary ...

Structural analogies between physical laws have received considerable attention from philosospheres of science. This paper, however, focusses on structural analogies between physical systems; this type of analogy plays an important role in the physical and technological sciences. A formal, set-theoretic description of structural analogies between physical systems is presented, and it is shown that a structural analogy between systems does not require a structural analogy with regard to the laws involved, nor conversely.

This paper examines the hypothesis that analogies may play a role in the generation of new ideas that are built into new explanatory theories. Methods of theory construction by analogy, by failed analogy, and by modular components from several analogies are discussed. Two different analyses of analogy are contrasted: direct mapping (Mary Hesse) and shared abstraction (Michael Genesereth). The structure of Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection shows various analogical relations. Finally, an "abstraction for selection theories" is shown to be the structure of a number of theories.

I will sketch a possible way of empirical/operational definition of space and time tags of physical events, without logical or operational circularities and with a minimal number of conventional elements. As it turns out, the task is not trivial; and the analysis of the problem leads to a few surprising conclusions.