David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 37 (1):50-63 (1970)
Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary "convergence of opinion" in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation
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William Roche (2012). A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.
William Roche (2012). Transitivity and Intransitivity in Evidential Support: Some Further Results. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):259-268.
Panu Raatikainen (2012). Ramsification and Inductive Inference. Synthese 187 (2):569-577.
William Roche (2013). On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence. Erkenntnis 79 (S3):1-19.
Jon Dorling (1974). Henry Cavendish's Deduction of the Electrostatic Inverse Square Law From the Result of a Single Experiment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 4 (4):327-348.
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