Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):85-96 (2007)
|Abstract||The purpose of the paper is to discuss whether a particular robot can be said to have an 'inner world', something that can be taken to be a critical feature of consciousness. It has previously been argued that the mechanism underlying the appearance of an inner world in humans is an ability of our brains to simulate behaviour and perception. A robot has previously been designed in which perception can be simulated. A prima facie case can be made that this robot has an inner world in the same sense as humans. Various objections to this claim are discussed in the paper and it is concluded that the robot, although extremely simple, can easily be improved without adding any new principles, so that ascribing an inner world to it becomes intuitively reasonable|
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