Conceivability and modal knowledge
In Tamara Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy. Rowman and Littlefield (1991)
|Abstract||I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true|
|Keywords||Experiment, Knowledge, Modality, Thought|
|Categories||No categories specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Modal Knowledge and Counterfactual Knowledge. Logique Et Analyse 54 (216):537-552.
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Ichikawa & Benjamin Jarvis (2011). Rational Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Noûs 46 (1):127-158.
Thomas Kroedel (2012). Counterfactuals and the Epistemology of Modality. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (12).
Peter Menzies (1998). Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections. In Roberto Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility. Erkenntnis 67 (3):387 - 399.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Conceivability, Imagination and Modal Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):364-380.
Sonia Roca-Royes (2011). Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge. Noûs 45 (1):22-49.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-06-22
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?