Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism

Synthese 190 (14):2835-2851 (2013)
Any knowledge-fallibilist needs to solve the conceptual problem posed by concessive knowledge-attributions (such as ‘I know that p, but possibly not-p’). These seem to challenge the coherence of knowledge-fallibilism. This paper defuses that challenge via a gradualist refinement of what Fantl and McGrath (2009) call weak epistemic fallibilism
Keywords Fallibilism  Knowledge  Concessive knowledge-attribution  Jeremy Fantl  Matthew McGrath  Gradualism
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0088-9
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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