Elusive epistemological justification

Synthese 174 (3):315 - 330 (2010)
Abstract
What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.
Keywords Meta-epistemology  Scepticism  Justification  David Lewis  Externalism  Knowledge  Reflection  Regress
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References found in this work BETA
David B. Annis (1978). A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3):213 - 219.
Jeremy Fantl (2003). Modest Infinitism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (4):537 - 562.

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