David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):41–69 (2007)
If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism-the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in whichknowledge has to be robust. Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology’s supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Earl Brink Conee (2004). Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2012). Is Knowledge Justified True Belief? Synthese 184 (3):247-259.
B. J. C. Madison (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis. Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
Similar books and articles
Frederick F. Schmitt (1983). Knowledge, Justification, and Reliability. Synthese 55 (2):209 - 229.
B. J. C. Madison (2010). Is Justification Knowledge? Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
Le Morvan Pierre (2002). Is Mere True Belief Knowledge? Erkenntnis 56 (2):151-168.
Stephen Hetherington (2005). Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads49 ( #98,171 of 1,902,847 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #64,023 of 1,902,847 )
How can I increase my downloads?