The Gettier-illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism

Synthese 188 (2):217-230 (2012)
Abstract
Could the standard interpretation of Gettier cases reflect a fundamental confusion? Indeed so. How well can epistemologists argue for the truth of that standard interpretation? Not so well. A methodological mistake is allowing them not to notice how they are simply (and inappropriately) being infallibilists when regarding Gettiered beliefs as failing to be knowledge. There is no Gettier problem that we have not merely created for ourselves by unwittingly being infallibilists about knowledge
Keywords Gettier cases  Knowledge  Safety  Gettier  Duncan Pritchard  Justified true belief  Infallibilism
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