David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 40 (3):539-547 (2012)
Taking his conceptual cue from Ernest Sosa, John Turri has offered a putative conceptual solution to the Gettier problem: Knowledge is cognitively adept belief, and no Gettiered belief is cognitively adept. At the core of such adeptness is a relation of manifestation. Yet to require that relation within knowing is to reach for what amounts to an infallibilist conception of knowledge. And this clashes with the spirit behind the fallibilism articulated by Gettier when stating his challenge. So, Turri’s form of response is irrelevant to that challenge, which was intended to pose a conceptual problem within fallibilist conceptions of knowledge. (And that failure on Turri’s part needs to be highlighted to remind epistemologists of the need to assess Gettier cases by a fallibilist standard. Although that need was described earlier by Robert Almeder, apparently his advice is being overlooked. This paper develops it anew, in a more general form.)
|Keywords||Gettier Sosa Turri Almeder Knowledge Fallibilism Infallibilism|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Anthony Robert Booth (2014). The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis. Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
Gwen Bradford (2015). Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation. Erkenntnis 80 (1):97-116.
Fernando Broncano-Berrocal (2014). Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 79 (4):733-754.
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