Why there need not be any grue problem about inductive inference as such

Philosophy 76 (1):127-136 (2001)
I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist targets, it is not thereby an enduring difficulty regarding experience's ability to impart epistemic justification via inductive evidence.
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819101000080
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Nathan Stemmer (2004). The Goodman Paradox: Three Different Problems and a Naturalistic Solution to Two of Them. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 35 (2):351 - 370.
Kenneth Boyce (2014). On the Equivalence of Goodman’s and Hempel’s Paradoxes. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 45 (1):32-42.

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