Rights and the second-person standpoint: A challenge to Darwall's account
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Stephen Darwall’s The Second Person Standpoint is built around an analysis of the “second-person standpoint,” which he argues builds in a series of presuppositions which help shape (and perhaps even give content to) morality. This paper argues that there is a kind of paradox tied up in the two central claims at the heart of this project – that second-personal address directs one practically rather than epistemically by giving reasons for action one otherwise would not have had, and that all moral obligation is second-personal in precisely this way – that I will argue forces us onto the horns of a dilemma. Two possible solutions to this dilemma are analyzed, one drawing on the Kantian notion of a “regulative ideal,” the other on Michael Thompson’s concept of “bipolar normativity.” Ultimately, I argue, neither is successful.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gideon Yaffe (2010). Comment on Stephen Darwall's the Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):246-252.
Stephen Darwall (2010). Precis: The Second-Person Standpoint. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):216-228.
Paul Gilbert (2008). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability - by Stephen Darwall. Philosophical Books 49 (2):178-180.
Gary Watson (2007). Morality as Equal Accountability: Comments on Stephen Darwall's the Second‐Person Standpoint. Ethics 118 (1):37-51.
Stephen L. Darwall (2006). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Harvard University Press.
Owen Ware (2010). Fichte's Voluntarism. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):262-282.
Linda Radzik (2011). On Minding Your Own Business: Differentiating Accountability Relations Within the Moral Community. Social Theory and Practice 37 (4):574-598.
Michael D. Barber (2008). Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Responsibility: Darwall and Levinas on the Second Person. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):629 – 644.
Christine M. Korsgaard (2007). Autonomy and the Second Person Within: A Commentary on Stephen Darwall's the Second‐Person Standpoint. Ethics 118 (1):8-23.
Stephen Darwall (2009). The Second-Person Standpoint An Interview with Stephen Darwall. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1):118-138.
Added to index2010-02-11
Total downloads74 ( #17,580 of 1,096,609 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #265,701 of 1,096,609 )
How can I increase my downloads?