A reconception of meaning
Synthese 95 (1):77 - 94 (1993)
| Abstract | Nelson Goodman's proposal for a reconception of meaning consists in replacing the absolute notion ofsameness of meaning by that oflikeness of meaning (with respect to pertinent contexts). According to this view, synonymy is a matter of degree (of interreplaceability) with identity of expression as a limiting case. Goodman's demonstration that no two expressions are exactly alike in meaning is shown to be unsuccessful. Although it does not make use of quotational contexts for the test of interreplaceability, it is tantamount to their acceptance. Goodman rejects quotational contexts; I argue that they should be accepted. This move offers two advantages.Firstly, and mainly, it allows interlinguistic comparison of meaning, something that has not been deemed possible in the received version of Goodman's account.Secondly, it restores the full scale of likeness of meaning damaged by the renunciation of those contexts that guarantee difference in meaning for diverse expressions. | |||||||||
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Daniel Whiting (2009). Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):575-599.
Daniel Whiting (2008). Meaning Holism and de Re Ascription. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 575-599.
Hannes Leitgeb (2008). An Impossibility Result on Semantic Resemblance. Dialectica 62 (3):293-306.
C. J. L. Talmage (1994). Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning. Erkenntnis 40 (2):213 - 225.
Michael D. Root (1977). Nelson Goodman and the Logical Articulation of Nominal Compounds. Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (2):259 - 271.
Daniel Whiting (2009). On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning: Use, Meaning and Normativity. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):416-434.
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