David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 7 (3):410-423 (1998)
Cortical color blindness, or cerebral achromatopsia, has been likened by some authors to ''blindsight'' for color or an instance of ''covert'' processing of color. Recently, it has been shown that, although such patients are unable to identify or discriminate hue differences, they nevertheless show a striking ability to process wavelength differences, which can result in preserved sensitivity to chromatic contrast and motion in equiluminant displays. Moreover, visually evoked cortical potentials can still be elicited in response to chromatic stimuli. We suggest that these demonstrations reveal intact residual processes rather than the operation of covert processes, where proficient performance is accompanied by a denial of phenomenal awareness. We sought evidence for such covert processes by conducting appropriate tests on achromatopsic subject M.S. An ''indirect'' test entailing measurement of reaction times for letter identification failed to reveal covert color processes. In contrast, in a forced choice oddity task for color, M.S. was unable to verbally indicate the position of the different color, but was surprisingly adept at making an appropriate eye movement to its location. This ''direct'' test thus revealed the possible covert use of chromatic differences
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Claudia Carrara Augustenborg (2010). The Endogenous Feedback Network: A New Approach to the Comprehensive Study of Consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):547-579.
Similar books and articles
David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
R. W. Kentridge (1999). When is Information Represented Explicitly in Blindsight and Cerebral Achromatopsia? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):156-157.
Thomas Wachtler (2005). Interindividual Variation in Human Color Categories: Evidence Against Strong Influence of Language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):510-510.
David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
Mohan Matthen (2010). Color Experience: A Semantic Theory. In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. 67--90.
Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
E. N. Sokolov (2001). Sphericity in Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (4):703-704.
Berit Brogaard (2011). Color Experience in Blindsight? Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):767 - 786.
Charles A. Heywood, Robert W. Kentridge & Alan Cowey (2001). Colour and the Cortex: Wavelength Processing in Cortical Achromatopsia. In Beatrice De Gelder, Edward H. F. De Haan & Charles A. Heywood (eds.), Out of Mind: Varieties of Unconscious Processes. Oxford University Press. 52-68.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #146,903 of 1,101,764 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #81,958 of 1,101,764 )
How can I increase my downloads?