Strict conditionals: A negative result

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):536–549 (2006)
Jonathan Lowe has argued that a particular variation on C.I. Lewis' notion of strict implication avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. We show that Lowe's notion of implication does not achieve this aim, and offer a general argument to demonstrate that no other variation on Lewis' notion of constantly strict implication describes the logical behaviour of natural-language conditionals in a satisfactory way.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.457.x
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PhilPapers Archive Jan Heylen, Strict conditionals: A negative result
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References found in this work BETA
E. J. Lowe (1995). The Truth About Counterfactuals. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):41-59.
Rudolf Carnap (1946). Modalities and Quantification. Journal of Symbolic Logic 11 (2):33-64.

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