David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Hypatia 26 (2):333-351 (2011)
Helen Longino's account of objectivity has been highly regarded by both feminist and mainstream philosophers of science. However, I have encountered three feminist philosophers who have all offered one especially compelling feminist critique of Longino's view: far from vindicating or privileging the work of feminist scientists, Longino's account actually requires the active cultivation of anti-feminist and misogynist scientists to balance out the possibility of feminist bias. I call this objection the Nazi problem, for the particular version that claims that her view requires even the active cultivation of Nazi scientists in objective inquiry. In this paper I consider one response to the Nazi problem, which I call the good faith argument. I show that the good faith argument itself is just as objectionable, on feminist grounds, as the Nazi problem it is meant to address
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References found in this work BETA
Justin B. Biddle (2009). Advocates or Unencumbered Selves? On the Role of Mill's Political Liberalism in Longino's Contextual Empiricism. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):612-623.
Miranda Fricker (2003). Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing. Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):154-173.
Kristen Intemann (2005). Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1001-1012.
Janet A. Kourany (ed.) (1997). Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions. Princeton University Press.
Thomas S. Kuhn (1977). The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. University of Chicago Press.
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