A causal theory of counterfactuals

Noûs 39 (4):632–657 (2005)
Abstract
I develop an account of counterfactual conditionals using “causal models”, and argue that this account is preferable to the currently standard account in terms of “similarity of possible worlds” due to David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. I diagnose the attraction of counterfactual theories of causation, and argue that it is illusory.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Kit Fine (1975). Critical Notice. Mind 84 (335):451 - 458.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Rachael Briggs (2012). Interventionist Counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies 160 (1):139-166.
    David Manley (2012). Dispositionality: Beyond The Biconditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):321 - 334.

    View all 12 citations

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